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THE MIDDLE INITIAL
By PERCY S. MoRRms*
The Colorado attorney whose practice includes the examina-
tion of titles to property and the approval or rejection of such titles
based on variences concerning middle names and initials is faced
with a serious problem. A consideration of the Colorado cases in
point may suggest some revision of his office procedure.
The problem of "what's in a name" arose early in Colorado in
the 1872 case of Doane v. Glenn' when the court said:
The next error assigned is the refusal of the court to allow
plaintiffs to read in evidence the deposition of James W.
Hanna. Several objections were made by the defendants,
which we will notice in the following order:
1. The commission is to take the deposition of James H.
Hanna, and the deposition taken is that of James W. Hanna.
There is nothing in the first objection. In legal contem-
plation, the middle letter constitutes no part of one's name.
The law knows but one Christian name, and the omission
or incorrect insertion of a middle name or initial is imma-
terial in pleading; so also in a commission to take deposi-
tions.:
During the period between 1872 and 1957, there was no decision
of the Colorado Supreme Court involving the question of a vari-
ance with respect to middle initials or names, but there were three
decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals relating to that question.
The first case was German Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Nat'l. State
Bank of Boulder." In that case the variance was between the name
W. J. Motley, which appeared in a garnishment summons served on
a bank, and W. G. Motley, the name of one who had an account in
the bank. The Court of Appeals reversed a judgment against the
defendant bank, saying in part:
Out of these facts sprang the law which is found laid
down in the early authorities, that the middle letter formed
no part of the name of any person. In other words, in con-
formity with the then existing custom, the court said that a
man was known by l is first name, and accuracy in that re-
spect was all that the law required. The law and the deci-
sions, which were the outgrowth of the existing conditions
of society, can manifestly have no application to our modern
commercial organizations. The wide extension and rapid
increase of population, the great and unprecedented growth
of commercial transactions, have compelled the use of dif-
ferent forms, and the adoption of different methods to dis-
tinguish individuals. The middle name, or the middle letter,
is as much a part of a man's name in this part of the present
century as either his christian [sic] or his surname. The
result is that the more modern authorities in the eastern and
*Mr. Morris is a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations.
1 1 Colo. 495 (18/2), rev'd an other grounds, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 33 (1874).
2 Id. at 502.
33 Colo. App. 17 (1892).
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commercial states have adjudged that the middle letter, or
the middle name, is as essential to the accuracy of the writ
as either the christian [sic] or the surname.
4
However, after having stated that the middle name or middle
letter is as much a part of a man's name as either his Christian or
his surname, the court proceeded to limit and confine its decision
to that particular class of cases, namely, cases which involved garn-
ishments of banks.
The same case5 was again before the Court of Appeals following
a retrial in which the court affirmed its former opinion and then
proceeded to give additional grounds for this affirmation, all of
which related exclusively to business practice in banking.
The third decision of the Court of Appeals was in the case of
Gibson v. Foster,6 where the court said:
The middle name or initial in a person's name has become
quite material in modern times, especially as a distinguish-
ing identification of the person. Many persons now have
the same Christian, or given, name, and the same patro-
nymic, family or surname, and it is by the middle name or
initial only, in many instances, that the person may be dis-
tinguished or identified in writing....
There is no presumption that Albert S. and A. L. Dele-
plane, or that A. S. and A. L. Deleplane, are the same person.
However, the language quoted above was probably dictum,
since the court could have disposed of the variance in names with-
out going into questions relating to the middle name or initial by
basing its decision on the fact that only the initial A of the Christian
name was used instead of the full Christian name Albert.
The great weight of authority supports the early holding of
Doane v. Glenn that in legal contemplation the middle letter con-
stitutes no part of one's name and that the law knows but one
Christian name, and the omission or incorrect insertion of a middle
name or initial is immaterial.
Mr. Patton, in his work on titles, says:
It is an ancient rule that the law shall recognize but two
names of an individual, the family or surname, and the
given or Christian name. Under this rule, if two or more
Christian names are used, the middle name, names, or ini-
tials are disregarded, and any discrepancy therein is im-
material. Of more general acceptance at this time is the
holding that the insertion in one name and the omission in
the other of a middle name or initial is immaterial unless
the first name is itself an initial only. The rule came into
existence at a time when few people had more than two
names, but several courts now hold that in modern times a
middle name or initial has become an essential part of the
given name, for the purpose of distinguishing persons, and
that it should be considered in determining the question of
variance. Whether justified by the decisions of their own
state or not, it has become a very general practice for ex-
4 Id. at 19.
5 German Nlat'l Bank of Denver v. Nat'l State Bank of Boulder, 5 Colo. App. 427 (1895).
6 24 Colo. App. 434, 436 (1913).
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aminers to require additional evidence of identity when the
records show a difference in middle names or initials, or
show their insertion in one only of two otherwise similar
names.'
Attorneys in Colorado, in examining abstracts of title, have
uniformly considered the middle initial or the middle name to be as
much a part of a person's name as the Christian name, or initial, in
spite of the Doane v. Glenn decision. According to Mr. Patton, this
would seem to be in accordance with the general practice for ex-
aminers "whether justified by the decisions of their own state or
not." This practice of the Colorado attorneys is undoubtedly based
upon the realities of the modern day as against a legal fiction based
upon conditions existing in the Middle Ages.
However, the problem has been pinpointed by the Colorado
Supreme Court in two comparatively recent decisions, in which the
rule of Doane v. Glenn is again applied.
7 1 Patton, Titles 76 (2d ed. 1957).
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The first of these two decisions is Nelson v. District Court.-
That case involved the variance of the name Elizabeth G. Nelson,
which was signed to the receipt for a registered letter that was sent
to secure service of process, from the name Elizabeth L. Nelson,
which appeared in the complaint as the name of the defendant. The
court said:
The middle initial is not the test; it is no part of a per-
son's name.
The middle initial is no part of a person's name, accord-
ing to the weight of authority, and, therefore, no import-
ance attaches to its omission, or to the insertion of an er-
roneous initial in place of the correct one. A similar mis-
take made by the insertion of a middle initial where the
correct name contains no middle initial is likewise regarded
as immaterial. . . . 42 Am. Jur., page 86, sec. 99.9
That decision was followed by the supreme court in its opinion
in the case of Clark v. Nat'l Adjusters, Inc.'0 In that case a money
judgment by default had been entered in a previous action, and the
defendant against whom the judgment was obtained brought a suit
to have the judgment vacated and to set aside the proceedings that
had been taken subsequent to such judgment. One of her grounds
of attack upon the service of process in the first action was that she
was improperly named in the summons, the name therein having
been Odessa Clark and not Odessa W. Clark. In passing upon such
ground, the court said, "The omission in the summons of the plain-
tiff's middle initial was immaterial. This court has held that in legal
contemplation such initial constitutes no part of one's name, the law
knowing but one Christian name."'"
The variance in each of the three decisions of the Colorado
Supreme Court did not involve a full middle name. In Doane v.
Glenn'2 and in Nelson v. District Court13 there was a difference in
the middle initials. Clark v. Nat'l Adjusters, Inc., 4 involved the
omission of the middle initial. The Nelson decision made no refer-
ence to middle names, but, in Doane, the court used the phrase "and
the omission or incorrect insertion of a middle name or initial" and
in both the Doane and Clark cases, the court used the phrase "the
law knows but one Christian name."
However, if these decisions are to be considered applicable to
deeds, encumbrances and other instruments affecting title to real
estate, they must be considered to be applicable not only to the in-
sertion or omission of a middle initial but also to the insertion or
omission of a middle name and to the use of a middle name in one
instrument that is entirely different from the middle name used
in the other instrument. If, as the Colorado Supreme Court said,
"the law knows but one Christian name" and if such holding is ap-
plicable to instruments affecting title to real estate, it logically fol-
lows that as long as the Christian name and the surname are the
8 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (1957).
9 Id. at 480, 320 P.2d at 962.
10 140 Colo. 593, 348 P.2d 370 (1959).
11 Id. at 595, 348 P.2d at 372.
12 1 Colo. 495 (1872).
13 Supra note 7.
14 Supra note 9.
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same, any variance in the middle name must be disregarded as be-
ing immaterial.
None of these decisions related to variances in names appear-
ing in deeds, deeds of trust and other instruments affecting title to
real estate. Each of them involved proceedings in lawsuits. In
Doane the variance was in a commission for the taking of a deposi-
tion; in Nelson the variance was in the receipt for a registered letter
sent to secure service of process; in Clark the variance was in the
summons. In Doane the court said "the law knows but one Chris-
tian name, and the omission or incorrect insertion of a middle name
or initial is immaterial in pleading, so also in the commission to take
depositions," but in Nelson and in Clark the opinions contained no
language which prevented the rules laid down therein from being
general rules applicable in all situations, including those in which
the instruments affect title to real estate.
Assuming that these decisions are applicable to instruments af-
fecting title to real estate, none of them would impair the effect of
the Colorado curative statute. 15 That statute remedies variances be-
tween names appearing in two instruments, both of which have been
recorded for more than three years, in three situations, namely: (1)
where the full Christian name appears in one instrument and only
the initial letter of that Christian name appears in the other; (2)
where the full middle name appears in one name and only the initial
letter of that middle name appears in the other; and (3) where the
initial letter of a middle name appears in one name and does not
appear in the other. The three cases would not be applicable to a
variance arising from the first of these, namely, the full Christian
name appearing in one instrument and only the initial letter of that
Christian name appearing in the other, because the decisions relate
only to the middle name or the middle initial. If applicable to in-
struments affecting title to real estate, the decisions would render
immaterial the other two variances, namely, the variance arising
from a full middle name appearing in one name and only the initial
letter of that middle name appearing in the other, and the variance
arising from the initial letter of a middle name appearing in one in-
strument and not appearing in the other, because, under such deci-
sions, any variance with respect to the middle name or middle initial
would be immaterial.
However, if such decisions are applicable to instruments affect-
ing title to real estate, they would have a much greater effect upon
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discrepancies in middle names than does the statute. In the first
place, under the statute, both instruments must have been of record
for at least three years, whereas, by the decisions, the variance
would be considered immaterial irrespective of the record date.
Secondly, the variances remedied by the statute are variances which
are not inconsistent with each other, because, in order that the
statute may remedy the defect there must be a situation in which
the middle initial in one instrument is the initial of the middle name
that appears in the other instrument, or a situation in which the
middle initial appears in one name but does not appear at all in the
other name, whereas, under the decisions, the variance would be
considered immaterial no matter how inconsistent the names might
be with each other, so long as the Christian name and the surname
are the same. For example, if the names of the grantee in one in-
strument appeared as John Jones Smith and the name of the gran-
tor in the subsequent instrument appeared as John Robertson Smith
the statute would not apply, but the decisions would render the
variance immaterial because they apply no matter what the dis-
crepancy in the middle names and initials might be. Such a result
would seem to be entirely unacceptable to the overwhelming ma-
jority of attorneys.
Colorado attorneys cannot ignore these decisions. If after ex-
amining the abstract for the purchaser and in accordance with the
general practice of attorneys in this state, one should reject the title
as unmarketable because of a discrepancy such as in the example
cited above, he might find himself faced with the necessity of hav-
ing to sustain his rejection of the title in a suit brought by the pur-
chaser to recover the deposit that had been paid on the purchase
price, by convincing the court that these three Colorado Supreme
Court decisions are not applicable to variances in middle names or
middle initials in instruments affecting the title to real estate.
Three alternative courses should be given consideration by the
attorneys of Colorado. The first of these is for the attorneys of the
state to accept the three decisions as being applicable to instruments
affecting the title to real estate and to pass as immaterial all vari-
ances of every nature in middle names and initials in instruments
affecting title to real estate. The second course is to have presented
to the Colorado Supreme Court for its determination the question
of whether such three decisions are applicable to instruments affect-
ing title to real estate. The third course is to seek legislative enact-
ment of a statute which expressly sanctions the general practice of
Colorado attorneys, which now exists and has existed for many
decades, of considering the middle name and the middle initial as
material parts of a person's name.
In my opinion, the first course, that of accepting the decisions
as applying to instruments affecting title to real estate, is unthink-
able, since it would not only upset the general practice of attorneys
in this state, but it would ignore the realities of the modern age in
which the middle name or initial must be considered as a part of the
identification of a person. It would result in great confusion, par-
ticularly with respect to the necessity of including in abstracts those
judgments against, wills of, and decrees of heirship with respect to
persons having the same Christian name and surname but different
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middle initials or middle names as compared with the names of the
owners of record of the properties.
The second course, that of securing a determination from the
court of the question of whether the three decisions are applicable
to variances in names in instruments affecting title to real estate,
is also impracticable. A case involving this question would require
several years of litigation if commenced in the district court and
reviewed on writ of error and in the meantime, the confusion and
uncertainty would continue to exist.
The most practical and logical solution is through legislative
action. The Legislature could resolve the problem simply by adding
the following language at the beginning of the 1953 Colorado Re-
vised Statutes, Sec. 118-6-16: "The middle name or the initial of a
middle name appearing in a name contained in an instrument af-
fecting title to real estate or in a signature or an acknowledgment
thereto shall be deemed prima facie to be a material part of such
name"; and by which amendment there are also inserted the words
"Provided, however, that" at the beginning of the first sentence of
said section as it now reads. Such a statute would be consistent
with the reasoning of the Colorado Court of Appeals in German
National Bank of Denver v. Nat'l. State Bank of Boulder 16 and in
Gibson v. Foster.17 The validity and constitutionality of such amend-
ment would be unassailable, because it would relate to the prima
facie presumption of identity of persons resulting from identity of
names, and therefore would merely state a rule of evidence. Fur-
thermore, such amendment might be enacted in the session of the
Legislature which begins in January, 1961 which would avoid a long
period of uncertainty.
16 3 Colo. App. 17 (1892).
17 24 Colo. App. 434 (1913).
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